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This paper examines the characteristics ofthe
five post-Korean War business cycles. We em-
phasize particularly the most recent recession,
which was the severest of the group and was
distinguished from the others by a high-and
largely unanticipated-rate ofinflation. Indeed,
there is reasonto believe thatinflationcontribut-
ed significantly to the severity of the 1973-75
recession. Themagnitude and unexpectedness of
this price upsurge led tochangesinbehaviorthat
were most evident in consumption spending and
inventory investment.
Our basic approach is to analyze thecontribu-
tion of the major sectors of the economy to
fluctuations in real output, as measured by gross
national product in 1972 dollars. I Essentially, we
analyze the cycle by identifying the sectors that
contribute to cyclical turningpoints. Additional-
ly, we note the common characteristics of the
observed recessions and recoveries of the past
two decades. The recessions have been short in
length, while the recoveries have shown consid-
erable regularity in their pattern ofgrowth-but
not their duration, which has varied substantial-
ly over time.
Our central thesis is that consumption spend-
ing and inventory investment were distorted
from their usual pattern ofbehavior in the 1973-
75 period, as the high rate ofinflationalteredthe
expectations and responses of consumers and
businessmen in the recession phase ofthe cycle.
Consumers reacted to the uncertainty intro-
duced by a large and unanticipatedinflationrate
by restraining expenditures and increasing sav-
ings, despite continued increases in income and
employment prior to the cyclical peak. Con-
versely, businessmen reacted to accelerating
price increases of materials by increasing their
stocks of such goods, despite the decline in real
output.
I. Characteristics of Recoveries
The similarities ofthe five post-Korean cycli-
cal recoveries can be seen by comparing the
cumulative growth of real output for each of
those periods (Chart 1). Eight quarters after the
cyclical trough, the average annual growth rates
ranged between roughly 5 and 6 percent. (For
those recoveries which lasted at least twelve
quarters, the growth range narrowed somewhat,
to about 4 to 5 percent.)
Strongearlygrowth is no particularguarantee
of the longevity of recovery (and vice versa),
since the first two years of the great 1961-69
expansion represented one of the weakest ofall
recoveries. Yet that recovery became the longest
cyclical expansion in the 123-year annals of the
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National Bureau of Economic Research. The
current recovery has beenatorclose tothe topof
the growth range for its first eight quarters. It
should be remembered, however, that that rec-
overy was preceded by the most severe post-
Korean recession-and that rapid recovery does
not always imply a sustainable recovery.
In all cyclical recovery periods, personal con-
sumptionexpenditures haveconstitutedthe larg-
est share ofthe increase in total output, varying
between 48 percent and 65 percent in individual
cycles (Table 1). This magnitude is to be expect-
ed, since consumption expenditures generally
account for nearly two-thirds of total spending
in theeconomy. Yet despite its size, consumption
spending is not the most active sectorin promot-
ing the expansion oftotal output. Consumptionspending is constrained byincome, whichinturn
equals the total value of the components of
output, as described in the usual definitional
equation of income determination.
Y = C+I+X+G
when
Y = income (i.e., market value of output)
C = consumption spending
I = investment spending
X = net exports
G = government spending
Thus, all of the major sectors ofthe economy
contribute to total income, varying in degree
from recovery to recovery. But the relation of
consumption to income is a special one, with its
level determined by the level of income. This




where YD is disposable (after tax) income. The
relationship is highly stable in the long run but
less so in the short run. Changes in fiscal policy
may alter after-tax income and hence consump-
tion. Individuals may choose to save rather than
consume. Yet short-termshiftsin the savingsrate
are compatible with a stable long-term savings
rate in the context of permanent income.2 (Per-
manent income is a theoretical concept wherein
the individual is regarded as allocating his in-
come over his lifetime rather than limiting its
disposition to the year in which it is earned. That
is to say, this year's consumption or saving
decisions are usuallymadewithaneye tolifetime
income.)












Cumulative Changes in Major GNP Sectors in
Five Recovery Periods
(Percent of Change in Real GNP)
Recovery Period
1954.2- 1958.1- 1960.4- 1970.4-
1956.2 1960.1 1962.4 1972.4
Cumulative change 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Real GNP
Consumption 61.1 48.3 49.7 64.9
Residential Construction 4.9 12.3 7.3 15.6
Business Fixed Invest. 16.8 7.1 8.3 12.9
Inventory Invest. 15.5 26.3 11.7 5.7
Net Exports 4.0 ~0.5 ~3.4 ~1.3
Government ~2.3 6.5 26.4 2.2
Addendum:
Change in Real GNP 61.9 77.3 73.9 130.8
(Billions of 1972 dollars)




























A common characteristic of recessions is their
relatively short duration-fromtwo tofive quar-
ters (Chart 2). And unlike the situation in re-
coveries, the paths ofcontraction of real output
tend to diverge as recessions continue. The brief
1957-58 recession was the most severe for any
two-quarter period. The two longest
recessions~thoseof1969-70and 1973-75-were
respectively the least and most severe in overall
terms of the period covered. Yet each of these
lengthy recessions was marked by some unique
features. In 1969-70, the recession tended to be
prolonged by the General Motors strike oflate
1970. In 1973-75, the initially mild downturn
culminated after a year in a steep two-quarter
decline reminiscent of 1957-58.
Inventory investment stands out as far and
away the major factor in the cumulative reces-
sion declines in real output (Table 2). The sole
exception was 1953-54, when a massive reduc-
tion iIi. government spending occurred in the
wake of the Korean War demobilization. In
contrast, consumption spending has generally
contributed least to cyclical downturns, declin-
ing onlyin the 1957-58 and 1973-75 recessions. In
both instances, this was due to a fall in durable-
goods purchases-chiefly autos, the most vola-
tile portion of consumer spending. In each of
these cases, the decline in consumer spending
followed a period of exceptionally strong auto
sales.
16noted above it accounts for the bulk ofrecession
declines. In recessions, as businessmen's antic-
ipations of rising sales become disappointed,
inventory accumulation becomes involuntary,
and forcesbusinessmen to reduce stocks.
In the typical recession, a decline in business
fixed investment ranks second only to inventory
liquidation as a contributor to declining output.
The acceleration principle applies to business
capital spending as it does to inventory invest-
ment, though the time horizon of anticipated
sales must be extended. Inventory adjustment is
a function of current sales, while capacity-
expanding investment in plant and equipment is
a function of expected future sales. The expan-
sion ofcapacity takes time, perhaps as long as a
year after funds have been appropriated.4 How-
ever, when excess capacity exists (or increases),
expansion plans will be shelved or projects
stretched out until the sales outlook improves.
The result is a significant reduction in business
capital spending.
Largely because of differences in reaction
time, consumption spending-notinvestment-
tends to be the leader in each recovery. Con-
sumption decisions may be constrained by in-
come, but investment decisions are conditioned
by businessmen's assessment of future demand
and the facilities required to meet that demand.
Thus, businessmen may not react as quickly as
consumers to recovery prospects at the bottom
of a recession.
61t = f(5t - 5 t-l)
where current inventory investment (61t) is
governed by sales in the current period (5t)
relative to sales in the previous period (St-l)'
Even when consumption spending is growing, if
itgrows more slowly than in the past, the change
in inventories (61t) will decline.3 And it is
important to remember, it is the change (not the
level) of inventories which enters the GNP ac-
counts. The acceleration principle is symmetri-
cal; in the typical recovery, inventory investment
is second only to consumption in contributingto
the overall expansion ofoutput(Table 1), andas
Table 2
Cumulative Changes in Major GNP Sectors in
Five Recession Periods
(Percent of Change in Real GNP)
Consumption spending holdsup in a recession
because the so-called automatic stabilizers-
such as unemployment insurance and reduced
tax liabilities-cushion the decline in disposable
income. But consumption spending, although
not declining, does slow down, and the effect is
seen in an accumulation of business inventories
in excess oftheir desired levels. In consequence,
businessmen do not re-order goods until stocks
are reduced and brought into line with their
currentexpectationsofsales. This effect is perva-
sive, for inventories must be reduced atall levels
from retailers' shelves to manufacturers' ware-
houses. As new orders are reduced, production
falls and unemployment rises.
This response of inventory investment to
changes in consumer spending-the "accelera-
tion principle"-isexpressed in functional terms
as
Recession Period
1953.2- 1957.3- 1960.1- 1969.3- 1973.4- Average
1954.2 1958.1 1960.4 1970.4 1975.1 Share
Cumulative change -100.0 -100.0 -100.0 -100.0 -100.0 -100.0
Real GNP
Personal Consumption + 8.7 - 18.8 + 57.6 + 93.3 13.9 + 25.4
Residential Construction + 4.4 2.7 56.5 + 4.2 - 22.8 - 14.7
Business Fixed Invest. 4.9 - 26.5 - 17.6 - 76.7 22.1 - 29.5
Inventory Invest. 45.1 47.1 -202.3 83.3 - 56.3 - 86.8
Net Exports + 13.6 21.1 + 45.9 + 7.5 + 8.8 + 10.9
Government - 76.7 + 16.2 + 72.9 - 45.0 + 6.3 - 5.3
Addendum:
Change in Real GNP - 20.6 22.3 - 8.5 - 12.0 - 81.5 - 29.0
(Billions of 1972 dollars)
17m. The Different Recession
Chart 3
REAL GNP AND CONSUMPTION SPENDING
1975.3, eight quarters later, that the 1973.3 level
of real consumer spending was again reached
and surpassed. As in the 1953-54 and 1957-58
cycles, consumer spending for goods (not serv-
















Business cycles vary because ofcontemporary
forces which determine the length and vigor of
expansion and the severity of recessions. None-
theless, all of the cycles before the 1973-75
recession had certain common elements. Inven-
tory liquidation occurred early in each recession
and increased most in each recovery. But the
1973-75 recession was different; inventory liqui-
dation came late in the downturn and consump-
tion spendingdeclined even before the 1973 peak
was reached.
This recession was not only the most severe of
the post-World War II period, but the inflation
which accompanied(andpreceded) it was unpar-
alleled since the price upsurge of1946-47, caused
by the unleashing of pent-up wartime demand
and the easing ofprice controls. Prices generally
remained stable through most of the next two
decades, and then the inflation rate edged up to
the range of 4Y2-5 percent from 1968-1972. In
1973, the U.S. experienced the world-wide infla-
tion that was raging and which peaked domesti-
cally at nearly 14 percentlate in 1974. As a result,
consumers were doubly punished during the
recession, by an inflation-caused reduction in
real income and then by increasing unemploy-
ment.
Consumptionspending, which had beena firm
source ofsupport in the expansion that began in
1971, faltered in mid-1973 (Chart 3). It levelled
off in the late stages of the expansion, and
peaked in the third quarter of the year-one
quarter ahead of real output. It was not until
IV. Consumption: Inflation and Savings
In making their consumption and saving deci-
sions, consumers were at least as sensitive to the
inflation rate as they were to changes in real
income during the 1971-76 period (Chart 4). In
reviewing this period, Joseph Bisignano has
noted that individuals tend to react to unantic-
ipated inflation by increasing their rate of sav-
ing.6 Savings generally declined in 1971-72 as
inflationdecelerated, and then rose in 1972-73 as
inflationaccelerated. The parallelwas notexact;
in fact, the savings rate dipped in 1974 when the
inflation rate peaked, as the decline in real
disposable income indicated that there are limits
to the displacement of consumption by saving.
But then the relationship was re-established in
1975, as the inflation rate and the savings rate
declined together.
The general consumer response to inflation of
the unanticipated magnitude of 1973-75 was an
evident decision to reduce spending and increase
saving. Even in 1973, despite rising employment
and disposable income, real consumption re-
corded a slight decline. Moreover, consumers
responded, then and later, to the differential
impact of inflation on different sectors of con-


























infood expenditures. The demand for food as
such is highly inelastic at some point, since it is
necessary to sustain life. Yet real expenditures
for food declined early in 1973 in the face ofa 12
percent (annual rate) rise in food prices, and
spending remained depressed for three years
(Chart 5). Consumers were quick to adjust the
contents of their market baskets on the basis of
relative prices, reducing their consumption of
meat and processed foods and increasing their
consumption of fresh fruits and vegetables.? In
contrast, there was less possibility for substitu-
tion in housing, because ofmarket rigidities and
transaction costs, such as leases and costs of
search and moving.
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INCOME, INFLATION and the SAVINGS RATE
of durable goods declined by more than 15
percent, while purchases of nondurable goods
fell more than 3 percent. At the same time,
despite sharply rising prices ofservices, expendi-
tures in that category rose 4Y2 percent, with
housing services rising by 9\;1 percent.
This pattern reflects the ability of consumers
to seek and respond to possible substitutes.
Durable goods by their nature are deferrable. In
addition, there is ahighdegree ofsubstitutability
•Annual rate
19V. Inventories: Inflation Factor
Unlikeconsumers, businessmeninthe 1973~75
period generally did not .restrict theiLexpendi~
tures and increase their savings in the face of
inflation. Inventory investment, which typically
tumsdownearlyineach recession, did notdoso
in this case until real output bottomed out, and
liquidation ofstocks continued through the first
three quarters of the recovery (Chart 6). Quite
atypically, the inventory sector eased the rate of
decline in real output in 1974, and then held
down the rate of growth in the early stages of
recovery. The continued inventory build~up of
1974, in the face of declining consumption and
real output, might be explained in terms ofsuch
factors as involuntary accumulation of stocks.
However, special mention should be made ofthe
Chart 6
REAL GNP AND
CHANGES IN INVENTORY INVESTMENT
inflation expectations of businessmen engen-
diered by a rapid run-up in materials prices.
The sharp rise inwholesale pricesin 1974helps
explain much of the hehavior of inventories at
that time, reflecting the fact that changes in
stocks of materials and work in progress are
three times as volatile as changes in stocks of
finished durable goods.8 Durable goods pro-
ducers responded to the inflationary rise in the
wholesale prices of materials-which reached
rates 0[30-40percentinlate1974-byincreasing
their inventories ofmaterials relative to stocks of
finished goods, possibly in anticipation of fur-
ther price increases (Chart 7). This took place a
year after consumer demand had softened and
while total real output was already declining.
Thus, expectations ofprice inflation apparently
had a more significantimpactthanbusiness sales
expectations upon inventory investment policy






















CHANGES IN MATERIALS PRICES
AND RELATIONSHIP OF INVENTORIES
























20VI. Summary and Conclusions
A high and unanticipated rate of inflation tion of continued materials price increases. To
significantly altered theprofile ofthemostrecent some extent, then, the inflation that caused the
business cycle, causing it to differ from the consumer to pull in his horns and restrict his
average of other recent cycles. This is clearly spending also induced the businessman to spend
apparent from an examination ofconsumption more, in response to inflation rather than dem-
spending, which normallydominates most reces- onstrated final demand.
sion movements. The principal lesson Jor the future is that
The recent behavior of consumers suggests inflation cannot be lightly regarded as afactorin
that they may exert a considerable amount of the business cycle, particularly when that infla-
autonomous control over theiraggregate level of tion is unanticipated. Because of inflation, the
spending in theshortrun. This is not inconsistent profile ofthe last cycle was substantiallyaltered
with the view thatconsumption in the longrunis from the typical cycle sequence. Reduced con-
endogenous to thesystem and is astablefunction sumerspending reduced the rate ofgrowth prior
of income. However, the mood of the to the cyclical peak. Conversely, continued in-
consumer-whether optimistic, cautious, orjust ventory investment during most ofthe recession
plain uncertain-can generate major changes in cushioned the decline in real output. However,
the savings rate. when the inventoryadjustmentcame, it was swift
Consumers, faced with much greater than and severe. In the ensuing recovery, inventory
expected inflation in the early 1970's, became policy has been fairly conservative while the
uncertain and reacted by spending less and consumersavings rate has receded, reflectingthe
saving more, even before real output and em- reduced rate of inflation. Yet, since the severe
ployment had started to decline. Businessmen, and unexpected inflation of the 1973-74 period
on the other hand, continued to add to their apparently contributed tothedistortionsevident
inventories after output and consumption had in the most recent cycle, future episodes of this
turned down, accumulating stocks in anticipa- type should not be ruled out.
FOOTNOTES
1. The reference cycle turning points are determined by the 4. Shirley Almon, "Lags Between Investment Decisions and
National Bureau on the basis of the behavior of economic their Causes," Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 50,
indicators representing all sectors of the economy, such as 1968, pp. 193-206.
employment, prices, costs and profits and other measures that 5. Economic Report of the President, 1955, p. 15; 1959, p. 12.
range beyond production and income as represented by real 6. J.R. Bisignano, "The Effect of Inflation on Savings Behav-
grossnational product. Manyoftheseseries aremonthlyseries, ior,"EconomicReview, Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco,
and the reference turning points are designated on a monthly December 1975, pp. 25-26.
basis. Suppose that a series which coincides with cyclical 7. Agricultural Statistics 1976. U.S. Department of Agriculture,
movements,such astheindexofindustrialproduction, bottoms U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington: 1976, p. 561.
out in April and then starts to rise. April may then be the 8. Feldstein and Auerbach have recently taken issue with the
reference trough date, butsinceoutputwill be rising in Mayand "conventional wisdom" regarding inventorypolicy. Heretofore,
June, real GNP may rise in the second quarter, making the first inventory changes-especially in durable-goods manufactur-
quarter the trough for real GNP. ing-have been considered to be a lagged response to corpo-
See Victor Zarnowitz and Charlotte Boschan, "Cyclical Indi- rate sales expectations, as expressed in new orders or unfilled
cators: An Evaluation and New Leading Indexes," Business orders. According to this reasoning, if sales expectations are
Cycle Digest, U.S. Department of Commerce, May 1975, pp. v- disappointed, the increase in finished-goods inventories re-
xiv; Cyclical Analysis of Time Series; Selected Procedures in flects both the shortfall in sales and the original intended
Computer Programs, Gerhard Bry and Charlolle Boschan, increase in inventories. Feldstein and Auerbach question this
Technical Paper 20, National Bureau of Economic Research, theory of lagged response; they contend that the adjustment
New York: 1971, Chapter 3. process is much more immediate, taking place largely within
2. Albert Ando and Franco Modigliani, "The Life Cycle Hy- the current quarter, butalso incorporatingalonger-term period
pothesis of Saving: Aggregate Implicationsand Tests," Ameri- of adjustment to a "desired" level of inventories. The short lags
can Economic Review, LIlI, March 1963, pp. 79-80. The authors in this model would lead us to expect a prompt response to
state that when income declines, the savings rate will also fall. inflation of the 1973-74 type. Martin Feldstein and Alan Auer-
This happened in recessions prior to 1969-70 and 1973-75; in bach, "Inventory Behavior in Durable-Goods Manufacturing:
which the savings rate rose in the recession. See also Bert G. The Target-Adjustment Model,"BrookingsPapers onEconom-
Hickman, Growth and Stability in the Postwar Economy, ic Activity, 1976, pp. 351-392. D.A. Belsley, Industrial Produc-
Brookings Institution, Washington: 1960, pp. 259-261. tion Behavior: The Order-Stock Distinction, North-Holland
3. Michael K. Evans, Macroeconomic Activity, Harper & Row, Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1969, pp. 18-27, pp. 43-47.
New York: 1969, pp. 373-375.
21